Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67, p. 79, 1981

17 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2009

See all articles by Jeffrie G. Murphy

Jeffrie G. Murphy

Arizona State University College of Law

Date Written: 1981

Abstract

Many, including the author of this article, have quoted approvingly Hume’s criticism of the Lockean notion of tacit consent as a foundation for political obligation. Many have quoted the passage without comment, as though it constituted a self-explanatory and self-evidently sound refutation of such doctrines. This should not be the case, however, for the argument demands analysis, criticism and perhaps even rejection in part. This article begins that discussion. While it might seem natural to think that an autonomous person can be morally bound only by those rules to which he has freely consented, the most obvious and important rules of our moral life (‘Do not kill;' ‘Do not rape;' ‘Do not steal’) are rules to which we have never consented. The duty claim ‘Obey the law’, however, does not, manifest this intrinsic obviousness. This duty is not self-evident and seems to require that the duty be established as an obligation growing out of some act of consent. In cases where we really cannot perceive the intrinsic claim of the situation as our reason for acting, we then need second-order reasons, such as an obligation to act in conformity with consent.

Keywords: Lockean Theory of Tacit Consent, David Hume, Philosophy of Law

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Jeffrie G., Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices (1981). Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67, p. 79, 1981, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1462866

Jeffrie G. Murphy (Contact Author)

Arizona State University College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
(480) 965-5856 (Phone)
(480) 965-2427 (Fax)

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