Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands
Faith & Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 276, 1987
6 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2009
Date Written: 1987
Abstract
James Rachels has argued that a morally autonomous person (in Kant’s sense) could not consistently accept the authority of divine commands. Against Rachels, this essay argues (a) that the Kantian concept of moral autonomy is to be analyzed in terms of an agent’s responsiveness to the best available moral reasons and (b) that it is simply question-begging against divine command theory to assume that such commands could not count as the best moral reasons available to an agent.
Keywords: James Rachels, Immanuel Kant, Divine Command Theory
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Murphy, Jeffrie G., Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands (1987). Faith & Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 276, 1987, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469701
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