The Theory of Alimony

California Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 1, p. 1, 1989

81 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2009

See all articles by Ira Mark Ellman

Ira Mark Ellman

Center for the Study of Law and Society, Berkeley Law, University of California, Berkeley; Arizona State University College of Law; Arizona State University (ASU) - Department of Psychology

Date Written: 1989

Abstract

Although alimony has long been a feature of divorce law, there is no theory explaining why either spouse should have a financial obligation to the other that survives their marriage. Explanations based on gender roles, or assessments of blame for the marriage's failure, are inconsistent with modern attitudes. More recently, commentators and courts have suggested that contract or partnership concepts explain alimony obligations. In Part I of this Article, Professor Ellman demonstrates the inadequacy of theories that use analogies to contract or partnership to explain or justify the imposition of alimony obligations. In Part II he offers a new theory of alimony based on a societal policy of encouraging sharing behavior in marriage by requiring compensation, at divorce, for the loss in earning capacity arising from such sharing behavior. Employing three basic principles, subsidiary rules, and numerous examples, Part II develops this general policy into a comprehensive theory.

Keywords: Alimony, Family Law, Divorce

Suggested Citation

Ellman, Ira Mark, The Theory of Alimony (1989). California Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 1, p. 1, 1989, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1467791

Ira Mark Ellman (Contact Author)

Center for the Study of Law and Society, Berkeley Law, University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720-2150
United States

HOME PAGE: http://csls.berkeley.edu/people/csls-affiliates

Arizona State University College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Phoenix, AZ
United States

Arizona State University (ASU) - Department of Psychology ( email )

950 S. McAllister Ave
P. O. Box 871104
Tempe, AZ 85287-1104
United States

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