Cognitive and Moral Obstacles to Imputation

Jahrbuch Fur Recht Und Ethik – Annual Review of Law and Ethics, Vol. 2, p. 67, 1994

13 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2009

See all articles by Jeffrie G. Murphy

Jeffrie G. Murphy

Arizona State University College of Law

Date Written: 1994

Abstract

This article attempts to generate some anxiety about retributivism. The imputation of responsibility is a weighty matter that sets in motion powerful institutional and psychological mechanisms of blame and condemnation and coercive responses in the law. Most of the philosophical literature on the imputation of responsibility has focused upon the attributes that ought to be present in the agent before responsibility is imputed, but this article addresses the attributes that ought to be present, not in the agent, but in the one who imputes responsibility. This article addresses the obstacles or challenges to the legitimacy of imputation. It considers them within the context of retributive punishment.

Keywords: Retributivism, Criminal Law, Imputation

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Jeffrie G., Cognitive and Moral Obstacles to Imputation (1994). Jahrbuch Fur Recht Und Ethik – Annual Review of Law and Ethics, Vol. 2, p. 67, 1994, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469698

Jeffrie G. Murphy (Contact Author)

Arizona State University College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
(480) 965-5856 (Phone)
(480) 965-2427 (Fax)

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