Gorr on Actus Reus

Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 10, p. 18, 1991

2 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2009

See all articles by Jeffrie G. Murphy

Jeffrie G. Murphy

Arizona State University College of Law

Date Written: 1991

Abstract

This article analyzes Professor Gorr’s arguments about the actus reus requirement in criminal law. Gorr does not think that a fundamental reconceputalization of actus reus is in order, but his criticisms of those who argue for a fundamental reconceptualization fail. Under the heading of the actus reus requirement fourt different issues bearing on criminal liability are subsumed: (1) the law usually does not punish omissions, (2) the law usually does not punish for status alone, (3) the law usually does not punish for thoughts alone, and (4) the law usually does not punish for involuntary behavior. Traditional actus reus theory maintains that a requirement of a physical act is what unites them all, but critics persuasively show that this requirement will not work. However, the critics have failed to identify an alternative universal unifying principle. Perhaps, then, it is just a laundry list and any attempt to impose a common principle that unites what really are four important but quite different principles is simply, what Herbert Hart has called 'uniformity at the price of distortion.'

Keywords: Criminal Law, Actus Reus, Professor Gorr

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Jeffrie G., Gorr on Actus Reus (1991). Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 10, p. 18, 1991, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444894

Jeffrie G. Murphy (Contact Author)

Arizona State University College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
(480) 965-5856 (Phone)
(480) 965-2427 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
81
Abstract Views
1,524
Rank
547,134
PlumX Metrics