Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands

Faith & Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 276, 1987

6 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2009

See all articles by Jeffrie G. Murphy

Jeffrie G. Murphy

Arizona State University College of Law

Date Written: 1987

Abstract

James Rachels has argued that a morally autonomous person (in Kant’s sense) could not consistently accept the authority of divine commands. Against Rachels, this essay argues (a) that the Kantian concept of moral autonomy is to be analyzed in terms of an agent’s responsiveness to the best available moral reasons and (b) that it is simply question-begging against divine command theory to assume that such commands could not count as the best moral reasons available to an agent.

Keywords: James Rachels, Immanuel Kant, Divine Command Theory

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Jeffrie G., Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands (1987). Faith & Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 276, 1987, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469701

Jeffrie G. Murphy (Contact Author)

Arizona State University College of Law ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
(480) 965-5856 (Phone)
(480) 965-2427 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
145
Abstract Views
1,430
Rank
362,717
PlumX Metrics